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Abstract
We consider a cost allocation problem arising from a hub network
problem design. Finding an optimal hub network is NP-hard, so we
start with a hub network that could be optimal or not. Our main
objective is to divide the cost of such network among the nodes. We
consider two cases. In the one-way flow case, we assume that the
cost paid by a set of nodes depends only on the flow they send to other
nodes (including nodes outside the set), but not on the flow they receive
from nodes outside. In the two-way flow case, we assume that the cost
paid by a set of nodes depends on the flow they send to other nodes
(including nodes outside the set) and also on the flow they receive from
nodes outside. In both cases, we study the core and the Shapley value
of the corresponding cost game.
Keywords: game theory, hub network, cost allocation, core, Shap-
ley value.
1 Introduction
Hub networks play a fundamental role in modelling telecommunication,
transportation, and parcel delivery systems. Assume that there are users
located at different geographical nodes who need to send a certain flow of
data or goods to each other through costly connections. A planner needs to
locate an optimal number of hub facilities at some nodes so that each non-
hub node is connected to exactly one hub and all the hubs are connected
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to one another at a reduced cost (due to economies of scale). Hence, the
optimal flow of data/goods between any pair of origin-destination nodes has
a length of at most four: It must go from the point of origin to its assigned
hub (when the origin is not itself a hub), then to the hub assigned to the
destination (if it is a different node) and finally to the destination (again, if it
is not itself a hub). This topology is applied to Internet connections (Bailey,
1997), telecommunications between local networks (Greenfield, 2000), satel-
lite communication (Helme and Magnanti, 1989), airline networks (Bryan
and O’Kelly, 1999; Yang, 2009), small package delivery (Sim et al., 2009),
and biofuel supply chains (Roni et al., 2017).
Several classes of hub problems have been studied. Recent examples
include Contreras et al. (2017), Jankovic et al. (2017), Azizi (2018), Azizi
et al. (2018), Alumur et al. (2018), and Gu¨den (2018).
The main issue addressed in these papers is the study of algorithms for
computing optimal ways of sending goods between the nodes in such a way
that the total cost is minimized. Of course, location of the hubs plays a
relevant role in the minimization problem. See Alumur and Kara (2008)
and Farahani et al. (2013) for surveys on this literature.
Once we have computed the optimal (or quasi optimal) hub network,
another issue is how to divide the cost associated with such hub network
among the nodes. This question has been successfully addressed in sev-
eral kinds of problems. We mention some of them. Guardiola et al. (2009)
study production-inventory problems where players share production pro-
cesses and warehouse facilities. Bergantin˜os et al. (2014), Bergantin˜os and
Kar (2010), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010), Dutta and Mishra (2012),
Trudeau (2012) and Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2017) consider the cost of
connecting agents to a source. Moulin (2014) considers users that need to
connect a pair of target nodes in a network. Perea et al. (2009) consider
the problem of sharing the profits associated with a supply chain problem.
Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2015) consider the cost of cleaning a river.
Our paper is specially related with two of these problems. Bergantin˜os
et al. (2014) study source connection problems where a group of nodes re-
quire a service that can only be provided from a source. Computing an
optimal tree for such problems is NP hard. Then, given a tree, which can
be optimal or not, the authors study the problem of dividing the cost of
such tree among the nodes. We follow a similar approach because we divide
the cost of a hub network among the nodes. Perea et al. (2009) consider a
profit sharing problem associated with a supply chain problem. There is a
network and three kinds of agents over the network: suppliers, intermediary
centres, and retailers. The delivery of good from a supply node to a demand
node generates a profit. Besides, the transportation of goods through the
network has an associated cost. The authors associate a cooperative game
to such problems and study the core. Finally, they propose an allocation in
the core, which is not characterized. In this paper, we also study a trans-
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portation problem in a network. We associate a cooperative game, we study
the core, and we propose an allocation in the core based on the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953). Besides, we provide an axiomatic characterization of
such allocation.
However, few papers have studied the cost sharing issue associated with
hub problems. We mention three of them.
Skorin-Kapov (1998) studies p-hub allocation problems, where p hubs
must be optimally allocated. Several cooperative games are considered de-
pending on who the agents are (nodes or pairs of nodes) and what coalitions
can do (whether they must use the optimal network for the whole problem
or can construct the optimal network of the reduced problem induced by the
coalition). He studies the core of such games. Some games have an empty
core but others have not. Finally, he considers the nucleolus of such games.
Skorin-Kapov (2001) studies hub-like networks, which involve a p-hub
median problem where direct connection between nodes is possible. More-
over, there are savings when the traffic is high. He defines several associated
cooperative games where the set of agents are the links. He shows that some
of them can have an empty core, in other cases the core is a singleton, and
in other cases it has many points.
Matsubayashi et al. (2005) consider the case where the number of hubs
to be located is arbitrary, there is a cost of opening a hub, and there is a
congestion cost associated with nodes (the greater the flow through a node,
the greater its cost). They also define an associated cooperative game and
study its core. In the cooperative game, players are the nodes and the
characteristic function is defined assuming that each coalition cooperatively
constructs a network. Moreover, each coalition assumes that the rest of the
nodes do not establish any hub nodes and the coalition can determine the
routing of all the traffic generated by the other nodes. Given this, they
prove that the core could be empty, but they find a sufficient condition for
the non-emptiness of the core and propose an allocation in the core when
this sufficient condition is satisfied.
The three papers mentioned above follow a similar approach. The first
step is to consider a class of hub problems, the next is to associate a coop-
erative game with each problem in the class, and the last one is to study
the core of such problems. If the core is nonempty, an allocation in the core
could be considered as a nice way of sharing the cost among agents.
Our paper also focuses on the cost sharing issue. We consider two cases.
In the first case (called one-way flow) we assume that the cost paid by a
set of nodes S depends only on the flow they send to other nodes (including
nodes outside S), but not on the flow they receive from nodes outside S. For
instance, when you use your mobile phone inside your country the amount
you pay depends only on the calls you make. This is the most common
case in practice and it has been considered in Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001)
and Matsubayashi et al. (2005). In the second case (called two-way flow)
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we assume that the cost paid by a set of nodes S depends on the flow they
send to other nodes (including nodes outside S) and also on the flow they
receive from nodes outside S. For instance, if you are travelling and you use
your mobile phone outside your country, the amount you pay depends on
the calls you make and also on the calls you receive.1 On the other hand,
you usually have to pay a minimum fare even in case you do not make calls,
and only receive them. As far as we know this is the first paper considering
this case.
Our main contributions are twofold. First, we study the existence of core
allocations. Second, unlike Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and Matsubayashi
et al. (2005), we also characterize axiomatically rules that belong to the
core and also satisfy other nice properties.
We now summarize our results for the one-way flow case. We consider
two cooperative games associated with each hub problem and related to
those presented by Skorin-Kapov (1998). In both games, the set of agents
is the set of nodes. Nevertheless, the way in which we compute the cost
game is different. In the first game, we consider that a network (which can
be optimal or not) has been already constructed and nodes can use only the
hubs associated with such network. Thus, we define the cost of a subset of
nodes S as the cost of sending the flow of all agents in S using only the hubs
available in the network. In the second game, we consider that each set of
nodes can construct the hub network they want. Thus, we define the cost of
a subset of nodes S as the cost of the optimal network we need for sending
the flow of all agents in S.
We study the cores of both games. The core of the first game has many
points. In any allocation in the core, each node pays the cost of sending its
flow and the cost of any hub is divided in any way among the nodes that
use such hub. As opposed, the core of the second game could be empty.
We study the Shapley value of the first game. In particular, we prove
that the Shapley value corresponds to the allocation where each node pays
the cost of sending its flow and the cost of any hub is divided equally among
the nodes that use it. Thus, the Shapley value belongs to the core. We also
provide two axiomatic characterizations of it. The first one uses core selec-
tion and equal treatment on hubs. Core selection says that the allocation
must be in the core. Suppose that the cost of a hub increases. Consider a
pair of agents such that both use the hub. Equal treatment on hubs says
that the allocation to both agents change in the same amount. Alternatively,
consider a pair of agents such that no one use the hub. Equal treatment on
hubs also says that their cost allocations change in the same amount. The
1Assume that you are from Spain but you are in Argentina. If you receive a phone call
from Spain, some phone companies consider it as an international call. The cost of this
international call is divided by your company in two parts. The people who phone you
pay the cost of a local call (inside Spain) and you pay the difference between the cost of
an international call and the cost of a local call.
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second characterization uses positivity (no node can obtain profits), equal
treatment of hubs, independence of irrelevant hubs (nodes are not affected
by a change in the cost of hubs that they do not use), and independence
of irrelevant flows (if the flow between two nodes increases, then the other
nodes should not be affected).
We now summarize our results for the two-way flow case. The study is
similar to the one-way flow case. We associate two games with this setting.
The first game is concave and hence its core is non empty. It consists of the
convex hull of the vector of marginal contributions. As opposed, the second
game may have an empty core.
We study the Shapley value of the first game. Since the game is concave,
it belongs to the core. We prove that the Shapley value corresponds to
the allocation where the cost of sending flow between any pair of nodes
is divided equally between both nodes. Besides, the cost of each hub is
divided equally between the nodes that use the hub. Finally, we provide
two axiomatic characterizations. The first one uses core selection, equal
treatment on hubs, and equal treatment on flows (if there is flow between
a pair of nodes and it increases then both nodes must be affected in the
same way). The second characterization uses positivity, independence of
irrelevant hubs, independence of irrelevant flows, equal treatment on hubs,
and equal treatment on flows.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we study the one-way flow case, where the nodes are only
interested in sending or receiving flow, but not both. In Section 4, we study
the two-way flow case, where the nodes are interested in both sending and
receiving flow. In Section 5 we give some examples. In Section 6, we present
the conclusions.
2 The model
We consider situations where a group of agents, located at different locations,
want to send and receive some specific good, which is sent through a costly
network. Besides, we should locate some hubs at the agents’ locations. All
hub agents are connected to each other and each non-hub agent is connected
only to a hub agent. We now introduce the model formally.
N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of nodes (also called agents).
C = (cij)i,j∈N is a cost matrix. For each i, j ∈ N, cij is the cost of sending
a unit of flow from node i to node j. We assume cii = 0, cij = cji ≥ 0 and
cik ≤ cij + cjk for all i, j, k ∈ N .
F = (fij)i,j∈N is the flow matrix. For each i, j ∈ N , fij represents the
amount of flow from node i to node j. We assume fij ≥ 0 and fii = 0 for
all i, j ∈ N . Notice that we do not assume fij = fji, i.e. the flow is not
necessarily symmetric.
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Each coordinate in d = (di)i∈N indicates the cost of maintaining or
constructing a hub at the respective node. We assume di ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Scalar α ∈ [0, 1] is the discounting factor of the cost when flow goes
between a pair of hubs. Namely, if node i and node j are both hubs, then
the cost of sending a unit of flow from node i to node j is αcij (instead of
cij).
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The first issue is to locate an optimal number of hubs, selected from the
set of nodes. Besides, each non-hub is linked to exactly one hub and all the
hubs are connected to each other. The triangle inequality cik ≤ cij + cjk
assures that the optimal path origin-destination uses at most two hubs.
When there is a hub in node i ∈ N , we say with some abuse of notation
that node i is a hub. Otherwise, we say that node i is a non-hub.
A hub network on N is determined by a nonempty set H ⊆ N and a
function h : N \ H −→ H such that h(i) is the hub linked to non-hub i.
Let H be the set of all hub networks on N . For notational convenience, we
write h(i) = i when i ∈ H, so that h is a function from N onto H. Besides,
we also write h for the network associated with the function h. Namely
h = {{i, h (i)} : i ∈ N \H} .
Thus, given two nodes i, j ∈ N , flow from node i to node j goes first from
node i to hub h(i), then to hub h(j) and finally to node j (i = h(i) and/or
h(i) = h(j) and/or h(j) = j are possible).
The cost of a hub network h is given by∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
(
cih(i) + αch(i)h(j) + ch(j)j
)
fij +
∑
i∈H
di.
For simplicity, we denote
λhij =
(
cih(i) + αch(i)h(j) + ch(j)j
)
fij
so that the cost is
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈H
di.
A hub network h ∈ H where
min
h∈H


∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈H
di


is reached is called optimal. Since H is finite, there is always at least one
optimal hub network.
2A generalization would be to assume that these costs are given by another cost matrix
Ch =
(
chij
)
i,j∈N
with chij ≤ cij for all i, j ∈ N . In our case, C
h = αC.
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We define a hub network problem as a tuple P = (N,C, F, d, α, h), where
h is a hub network.
Notice that we do not assume h to be an optimal hub network. We
know that computing an optimal hub network is NP-hard. Thus, in many
practical situations we use heuristics to decide the hub network h to be
constructed. Hence, we do not know exactly if such hub network is optimal
or not. We make a very weak assumption on h, all hubs are needed in order
to send the flow. Namely, for all k ∈ H there exist i, j ∈ N with fij > 0
and k ∈ {h (i) , h (j)}. If h is an optimal hub network the assumption holds.
In case h has been obtained using some heuristics, it seems reasonable to
assume that the heuristics can detect when a hub is needed.
We now define c(P ) as the cost associated with the hub network h.
Namely,
c(P ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈H
di. (1)
In many cases after finding an optimal (or quasi optimal) hub network,
we need to divide the cost of such network among the nodes. A rule is
a function R that assigns to each hub network problem P an allocation
R (P ) ∈ RN satisfying ∑
i∈N
Ri (P ) = c(P ). (2)
Our aim is to study the cost allocation problem generated by each hub
network problem P . We are interested in studying allocations both fair and
stable. The idea is to propose desirable properties and try to find a rule
satisfying many of them.
2.1 Properties
We consider two cases depending on the needs of the agents. In the one-way
flow case, we assume that each agent is only interested in the outgoing flow
(the case where each agent is only interested in the ingoing flow is analogous).
In the two-way flow case, each agent is interested in both outgoing and
ingoing flow.
We now define several properties. Since the definitions in the one-way
and two-way are quite similar (some of them are exactly the same), we only
define it once.
The first property says that no agent should obtain profit.
Positivity (Pos) For any hub network problem P and each i ∈ N , we have
Ri(P ) ≥ 0.
The second property says that equal agents must pay the same. Since
we are dealing with situations where h is given, we should consider such hub
network when defining equal nodes. Thus, given a hub network problem P
7
we say that nodes i and j are equal when several conditions hold: First,
fik = fjk for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} (in the two-way case we should add the
condition fki = fkj for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}). Second, fij = fji. Third, i ∈ H
if and only if j ∈ H (namely, node i is a hub if and only if node j is a
hub). Forth, {i, k} ∈ h if and only if {j, k} ∈ h (namely, if nodes i and
j are nonhubs then both are connected to the same hub). Fifth, for each
{i, k} , {j, k} ∈ h, cik = cjk.
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE) For any hub network problem P and
each pair of equal nodes i, j ∈ N , we have that Ri (P ) = Rj (P ).
The next property says that if a node does not send any flow in the
one-way flow case (respectively, a node does not send nor receive any flow
in the two-way flow case), then it pays nothing.
Null Flow (NF ) For any hub network problem P and each i ∈ N such
that fij = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i} (in the two-way we must add the
condition fji = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}), we have that Ri (P ) = 0.
The next property says that if the flow from node i to node j increases,
then in the one-way flow case node i cannot pay less, whereas in the two-way
flow case node i cannot pay less and also node j cannot pay less,
Flow Monotonicity (FM) For any pair of hub network problems P =
(N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F ′, d, α, h) such that there exist i, j ∈
N satisfying fij ≥ f
′
ij and fkl = f
′
kl otherwise, then Ri (P ) ≥ Ri (P
′)
(in the two-way we must add the condition Rj (P ) ≥ Rj (P
′)).
The next property says that if the cost of a hub increases, then no node
requiring such hub could pay less. Before giving the formal definition we
introduce some notation.
For each S ⊆ N , let HofS ⊆ H denote the set of hubs used for sending
the flow of agents in S. Namely,
HofS = {k ∈ H : ∃i ∈ S, j ∈ N with fij > 0 and k ∈ {h (i) , h (j)}} .
Notice that HofS ⊆ H is the set of hubs used by nodes in S in the one-way
flow case.
Given i ∈ N , we write Hofi instead of H
of
{i}. Notice that H
of
S =
⋃
i∈S H
of
i
for all S ⊆ N .
For each S ⊆ N , let HtfS ⊆ H denote the set of hubs used for sending or
receiving the flow of agents in S. Namely,
HtfS = H
of
S ∪ {k ∈ H : ∃i ∈ S, j ∈ N with fji > 0 and k ∈ {h (i) , h (j)}} .
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Notice that HtfS ⊆ H is the set of hubs used by nodes in S in the two-way
case.
Given i ∈ N , we write Htfi instead of H
tf
{i}. Again, H
tf
S =
⋃
i∈S H
tf
i for
all S ⊆ N .
Hub Monotonicity (HM) For any pair of hub network problems P =
(N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F, d′, α, h) such that there exists k ∈
N satisfying dk ≥ d
′
k and dj = d
′
j otherwise, then for each agent i such
that k ∈ Hofi (in the two-way flow case, we replace H
of
i by H
tf
i ), we
have that Ri (P ) ≥ Ri (P
′).
The next property says that if the cost of a link increases, then the two
agents located at its vertices could not pay less. This property coincides for
the one-way and two-way flow cases.
Cost Monotonicity (CM) For any pair of hub network problems P =
(N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C ′, F, d, α, h) such that there exists
i, j ∈ N satisfying cij ≥ c
′
ij and ckl = c
′
kl otherwise, then we have
that Ri (P ) ≥ Ri (P
′) and Rj (P ) ≥ Rj (P
′).
Assume that the cost of some hub dk decreases. It is then clear that if h
was an optimal hub network in the original problem it will be also optimal in
the new problem. How should agents be affected? The next two properties
provide an answer to this question.
The first one says that agents that use hub k or do not use hub k are
affected in the same way.
Equal Treatment on Hubs (ETH) For any pair of hub network prob-
lems P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F, d′, α, h) such that there
exists k ∈ N satisfying dk ≥ d
′
k and dj = d
′
j otherwise, then for each
pair of agents i, j such that k ∈ Hofi ∩H
of
j or k /∈ H
of
i ∪H
of
j (in the
two-way flow case, we replace k ∈ Hofi ∩ H
of
j by k ∈ H
tf
i ∩ H
tf
j and
k /∈ Hofi ∪H
of
j by k /∈ H
tf
i ∪H
tf
j ), we have that
Ri (P )−Ri
(
P ′
)
= Rj (P )−Rj
(
P ′
)
.
The second property says that agents that do not use hub k are not
affected.
Independence of Irrelevant Hubs (IIH) For any pair of hub network
problems P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F, d′, α, h) such that
there exists k ∈ N satisfying dk ≥ d
′
k and dj = d
′
j otherwise, then
Ri (P ) = Ri (P
′) for each agent i such that k /∈ Hofi (in the two-way
flow case, we replace k /∈ Hofi by k /∈ H
tf
i ).
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We now introduce a similar property to IIH but with flows instead of
hubs. Assume that node i increases its flow to some other node j. In the
one-way flow case, all nodes but i should not be affected. In the two-way
flow case, all nodes but i and j should not be affected.
Independence of Irrelevant Flows (IIF ) For any pair of hub network
problems P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F ′, d, α, h) such that
there exist j, k ∈ N satisfying 0 < f ′jk ≤ fjk and f
′
j′k′ = fj′k′ otherwise,
then Ri (P ) = Ri (P
′) for each agent i ∈ N \ {j} (in the two-way flow
case, we replace i ∈ N \ {j} by i ∈ N \ {j, k}).
The next property is not reasonable in the one-way flow case but it is in
the two-way case. It says that a variation of flow affects the sender and the
receiver in the same way.
Equal Treatment on Flows (ETF ) For any pair of hub network prob-
lems P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) and P ′ = (N,C, F ′, d, α, h) such that there
exist k, l ∈ N satisfying 0 < f ′kl ≤ fkl and f
′
ij = fij otherwise, we have
that
Ri (P )−Ri
(
P ′
)
= Rj (P )−Rj
(
P ′
)
for all pair of agents i, j such that {i, j} = {k, l} or {i, j} ∩ {k, l} = ∅.
2.2 Cooperative game concepts
We finally introduce some well-known concepts of cooperative game theory.
A cost game is a pair (N, cˆ) where N is the set of agents and cˆ : 2N → R
is a cost function satisfying cˆ (∅) = 0. Each nonempty subset S ⊆ N is
called a coalition, and cˆ (S) denotes the cost of providing the needs of all
agents in S. Since cˆ depends on N , we write cˆ instead of (N, cˆ).
We say that cˆ is concave if for all l ∈ T ⊂ S ⊆ N , we have cˆ(S) −
cˆ (S \ {l}) ≤ cˆ(T )− cˆ (T \ {l}).
We now introduce two well-known solution concepts in cooperative game
theory: the core (Gillies, 1959) and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
The core of a cost game cˆ is defined as
Core (cˆ) =
{
y ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
yi = cˆ(N) and
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ cˆ (S) ∀S ⊂ N
}
.
The main motivation behind the core is “stability”. Namely, to identify
the set of allocations such that no coalition of agents has incentives to leave
the grand coalition (N). It is well-known that, in general cost games, the
core may be empty. Nevertheless, when the cost game is concave, the core
is non-empty.
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The Shapley value is defined as the allocation Sh (cˆ) such that
Shi (cˆ) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|! (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[cˆ (S ∪ {i})− cˆ (S)]
for each i ∈ N .
The main motivation behind the Shapley value is “fairnes”. Namely,
to provide a fair way of dividing the total cost among the agents. Shapley
(1953) proved that the Shapley value is the unique allocation satisfying
the following four properties: efficiency (the total cost is divided among
the agents), symmetry (symmetric agents must pay the same), null agent
(if an agent does not increase the cost of any coalition, such agent should
pay nothing) and additivity (the allocation should be additive on the cost
function). Later on, several authors provided other characterizations of the
Shapley value which made it very popular as a fair outcome. It is well-
known that the Shapley value can be outside the core even when the core is
non-empty. Nevertheless, when the cost game is concave, the Shapley value
belongs to the core.
3 One-way flow
In this section we assume that nodes are interested only in the outgoing
flow. Namely, the cost of a group of nodes depends only on the outgoing
flow of such nodes. We first associate to each hub network problem a cost
game. Later, we study its core and its Shapley value.
For each hub network problem P , we associate the cost game cofP where
for each S ⊆ N , cofP (S) is the cost of sending the flow of all nodes in S to
all nodes through the hub network h. The cost game cofP models situations
where the hub network h (with associated set of hubs H) has already been
constructed. Thus, d could be considered as a vector of maintenance costs.
This cost game is formally defined as
cofP (S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈Hof
S
di (3)
for all S ⊆ N . When no confusion arises we write cof (S) instead of cofP (S).
Remark 3.1 Skorin-Kapov (1998) associates several games with each hub
network problem. One of them, denoted as c1, is closely related to c
of . In
our model, when h has a fixed number of hubs and di = 0 for all i, c
of
coincides with c1. Thus, c
of can be considered as a generalization of c1 to
our model. Besides, Skorin-Kapov (1998) proves that the core of c1 contains
the single allocation where each agent pays the cost of sending its flow.
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3.1 The core
In the next theorem we prove that the core of cof is the set of cost allocations
in which each agent pays the cost of sending its flow. Besides, the cost of
any hub is divided in any way among the agents that use the hub for sending
their flow.
Theorem 3.1 For each hub network problem P , the core of cof is nonempty,
and it is given by
Core
(
cof
)
=
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N xi = c(P ), xi =
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij + yi∀i ∈ N
where y ∈ RN+ and
∑
i∈S yi ≤
∑
i∈Hof
S
di∀S ⊂ N
}
.
Proof. “⊇” is obvious. We now prove “⊆”. Let x ∈ Core
(
cof
)
. For each
i ∈ N , we define yi = xi −
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij . Then, for each i ∈ N , xi can be
rewritten as xi =
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij + yi. Since, x ∈ Core
(
cof
)
, for each S ⊂ N,
cof (S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈Hof
S
di ≥
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
i∈S
yi
and thus
∑
i∈S yi ≤
∑
i∈Hof
S
di. It only remains to prove that y ∈ R
N
+ .
Suppose not. Let j ∈ N be such that yj < 0. Thus,∑
i∈N\{j}
xi =
∑
i∈N
xi − xj = c
of (N)− xj
=
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈N
λhik +
∑
i∈H
di −
∑
k∈N
λhjk − yj
=
∑
i∈N\{j}
∑
k∈N
λhik +
∑
i∈H
di − yj
>
∑
i∈N\{j}
∑
k∈N
λhik +
∑
i∈H
di
since HofN\{j} ⊆ H,
≥
∑
i∈N\{j}
∑
k∈N
λhik +
∑
i∈Hof
N\{j}
di = c
of (N \ {j})
which is a contradiction.
Skorin-Kapov (1998) also considers another game, denoted as c∗1, which
is obtained as c1 but assuming that each coalition can build their optimal
hub network. Namely, instead of using the hubs given by h, each coalition
can locate hubs wherever they prefer. Skorin-Kapov (1998) proves that the
core of c∗1 can be empty. Since, as argued in Remark 3.1, any cost game c
∗
is a particular case of some cof , this negative result also holds in our model.
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Nevertheless, we can study an intermediate situation. Assume that the
optimal hub network is not unique. Thus, we should decide which one to
construct. It could be the case that some agents prefer one over another.
Thus, we can define the cost of a coalition as the minimum over all optimal
hub networks. Namely, for each S ⊆ N ,
c∗ (S) = min
h∈H,h is optimal
{
cofP (h)(S)
}
where P (h) is the hub network problem induced by the optimal hub network
h.
Next example shows that the core of c∗ can be empty.
Example 3.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, cij = 1 for all i, j ∈ N , f12 = f23 = f31 =
1, f21 = f32 = f13 = 10, α = 1, and di = 6 for all i ∈ N . There exist
three optimal hub networks
{
hi
}
i∈N
, corresponding to putting a single hub
in each node i ∈ N , respectively. We will see that each two-node coalition
would prefer a different hub location. We start with coalition {1, 2}. We
compute cof
P (h1)
({1, 2}), cof
P (h2)
({1, 2}), and cof
P (h3)
({1, 2}):
cof
P (h1)
({1, 2}) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
j∈N
λh
1
ij +
∑
i∈Hof
{1,2}
di
= λh
1
12 + λ
h1
13 + λ
h1
21 + λ
h1
23 + d1
= (c12)f12 + (c13)f13 + (c21)f21 + (c21 + c13)f23 + d1
= (1)1 + (1)10 + (1)10 + (1 + 1)1 + 6
= 29.
cof
P (h2)
({1, 2}) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
j∈N
λh
2
ij +
∑
i∈Hof
{1,2}
di
= λh
2
12 + λ
h2
13 + λ
h2
21 + λ
h2
23 + d2
= (c12)f12 + (c12 + c23)f13 + (c21)f21 + (c23)f23 + d2
= (1)1 + (1 + 1)10 + (1)10 + (1)1 + 6
= 38.
cof
P (h3)
({1, 2}) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
j∈N
λh
3
ij +
∑
i∈Hof
{1,2}
di
= λh
3
12 + λ
h3
13 + λ
h3
21 + λ
h3
23 + d3
= (c13 + c32)f12 + (c13)f13 + (c23 + c31)f21 + (c22)f23 + d3
= (1 + 1)1 + (1)10 + (1 + 1)10 + (1)1 + 6
= 39.
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Thus, coalition {1, 2} would prefer the hub to be at 1, because
cof
P (h1)
({1, 2}) = 29 < min
{
cof
P (h2)
({1, 2}) , cof
P (h3)
({1, 2})
}
.
Analogously, coalition {1, 3} would prefer to locate the hub at 3, because
cof
P (h3)
({1, 3}) = 29 < min
{
cof
P (h1)
({1, 3}) , cof
P (h2)
({1, 3})
}
;
and coalition {2, 3} would prefer to locate the hub at 2, because
cof
P (h2)
({2, 3}) = 29 < min
{
cof
P (h1)
({2, 3}) , cof
P (h3)
({2, 3})
}
.
Let x be a core allocation. Then
100 = 2c∗ (N) = 2 (x1 + x2 + x3)
= (x1 + x2) + (x1 + x3) + (x2 + x3)
≤ cof
P (h1)
({1, 2}) + cof
P (h3)
({1, 3}) + cof
P (h2)
({2, 3})
= 29 + 29 + 29 = 87,
which is a contradiction.
Thus, the core of c∗ is empty.
3.2 The Shapley value
We now study the Shapley value of cof , which we call the Shapley rule. We
first give an explicit formula. Later, we provide two axiomatic characteriza-
tions.
In next theorem we prove that in the Shapley rule each node pays the
cost of sending its flow. Besides, the cost of any hub is divided equally
among the nodes that use the hub for sending their flow.
Theorem 3.2 For each hub network problem P and each i ∈ N ,
Shi
(
cofP
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Hofi
dj∣∣∣{k ∈ N : j ∈ Hofk }∣∣∣ .
Proof. We consider several cost games. Let c0 be defined as c0 (S) =∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij for each S ⊆ N . For each j ∈ N , let c
j be defined as
cj (S) = dj if j ∈ H
of
S and c
j (S) = 0 otherwise. Thus, for each S ⊆ N ,
cof (S) = c0 (S) +
∑
j∈N c
j (S). Since the Shapley value is additive on c,
we have that for each i ∈ N , Shi
(
cof
)
= Shi
(
c0
)
+
∑
j∈N Shi
(
cj
)
. Since
c0 is an additive game (there exists a ∈ RN such that for each S ⊆ N ,
c0 (S) =
∑
j∈S ai) we deduce that Shi
(
c0
)
=
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij . For each j ∈ N , in
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the cost game cj , all agents that use hub j (i.e. all k ∈ N such that j ∈ Hofk )
are symmetric and the agents that do not use hub j are dummy. Thus, for
each j ∈ N ,
Shi
(
cj
)
=


dj∣∣∣
{
k∈N :j∈Hof
k
}∣∣∣
if j ∈ Hofi
0 otherwise,
from where it is straightforward to check the result.
We now introduce a new property of rules which says that we must select
an allocation in the core of the problem.
Core Selection (CS) For any hub network problem P , we have that
R (P ) ∈ Core
(
cofP
)
.
There are some relations between CS and some ot the properties intro-
duced in Subsection 2.1.
Proposition 3.1 (a) CS implies Pos.
(b) Pos, IIH and IIF imply CS.
Proof. (a) Assume x ∈ Core
(
cof
)
. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
xi = c
of (N)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj ≥ c
of (N)− cof (N \ {i}) ≥
∑
j∈N\{i}
λhij ≥ 0.
(b) Let R be a rule satisfying Pos, IIH, and IIF . Fix S ⊂ N . Let ε > 0
and define PS,ε =
(
N,C, FS,ε, dS , α, h
)
as the problem obtained from P by
turning all positive flows not used by S into ε and all hub costs not used by
S into zero. Formally,
fS,εij =
{
ε if i /∈ S and fij > 0
fij otherwise
and
dSk =
{
0 if k /∈ HofS
dk otherwise.
Then, cof
PS,ε
(N) ≤
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij +
∑
k∈Hof
S
dk + a(P )ε where
a (P ) = |{fij : fij > 0}|max
{
λhij
fij
: fij > 0
}
.
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Now, ∑
i∈S
Ri(P )
IIH+IIF
=
∑
i∈S
Ri
(
PS,ε
)
= cof
PS,ε
(N)−
∑
i∈N\S
Ri
(
PS,ε
)
Pos
≤ cof
PS,ε
(N) ≤
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
k∈Hof
S
dk + a(P )ε
= cofP (S) + a(P )ε
which implies
∑
i∈S Ri(P ) ≤ c
of
P (S) because a(P ) does not depend on ε.
CS does not imply neither IIH nor IIF . The rule in which each node
pays the cost of sending its flow and the cost of each hub is paid equally
by the nodes that use the most expensive hubs among those that use that
hub satisfies CS but not IIH. The rule in which each node pays the cost
of sending its flow and the cost of each hub is paid equally by the nodes
sending more flow through this hub satisfies CS but not IIF .
In next proposition we prove that the Shapley rule satisfies all the prop-
erties introduced in Subsection 2.1 for the one-way flow case.
Proposition 3.2 The Shapley rule satisfies Pos, ETE, CS, NF , FM ,
HM , CM , ETH, IIH and IIF .
Proof. From Theorem 3.2, we deduce that Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies Pos, FM ,
HM , and CM . If i and j are equal in P , then it is not difficult to check that
i and j are symmetric in cof . Now, symmetry of the Shapley value implies
that Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies ETE. Any i ∈ N with fij = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i} is
a dummy player in cof . Hence, its Shapley value is zero, and so Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies NF . Let P, P ′ and k be given as in the definition of ETH and IIH.
Given i, j ∈ N such that k ∈ Hofi ∩H
of
j , under Theorem 3.2,
Shi
(
cofP
)
− Shi
(
cofP ′
)
=
dk − d
′
k∣∣∣{l ∈ N : k ∈ Hofl }∣∣∣ = Shj
(
cofP
)
− Shj
(
cofP ′
)
.
Given i, j ∈ N such that k /∈ Hofi ∪H
of
j , by Theorem 3.2
Shi
(
cofP
)
− Shi
(
cofP ′
)
= 0 = Shj
(
cofP
)
− Shj
(
cofP ′
)
.
Hence Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies ETH. Given i ∈ N such that k /∈ Hofi , from Theo-
rem 3.2 we know that Shi
(
cof
)
does not depend on dk, and so Shi
(
cofP
)
=
Shi
(
cofP ′
)
and hence Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies IIH. Let P, P ′ and i, j, k be given
as in the definition of IIF . From Theorem 3.2 we have that Shi
(
cof
)
does
not depend on fjk. Hence, Sh
(
cof
)
satisfies IIF . From Proposition 3.1, it
satisfies CS.
We now give two characterizations of the Shapley rule.
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Theorem 3.3 (a) The Shapley rule is the unique rule satisfying CS and
ETH.
(b) The Shapley rule is the unique rule satisfying Pos, IIH, IIF , and
ETH.
Proof. (a) By Proposition 3.2 the Shapley rule satisfies these properties.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let R be a rule satisfying CS and ETH.
Let P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) be any hub network problem. For each K ⊆ H,
let PK =
(
N,C, F, dK , α, h
)
with dK defined as follows:
dKi =
{
0 if i ∈ H \K
di otherwise.
For all k ∈ N , let Nk,0 =
{
i ∈ N : k /∈ Hofi
}
, Nk,1 =
{
i ∈ N : k ∈ Hofi
}
,
nk,0 =
∣∣Nk,0∣∣ and nk,1 = ∣∣Nk,1∣∣ for all k ∈ N . ETH implies that, for each
k ∈ K, there exist xk,0 and xk,1 such that for all i ∈ Nk,0,
Ri
(
PK
)
−Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
= xk,0 (4)
and for all i ∈ Nk,1
Ri
(
PK
)
−Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
= xk,1. (5)
Since N = Nk,0 ∪Nk,1 and∑
i∈N
Ri
(
PK
)
−
∑
i∈N
Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
= dk,
we have that for all k ∈ K,
nk,0xk,0 + nk,1xk,1 = dk. (6)
The equivalence relation in N defined as
i ∼ j ⇔ ∃k ∈ K : i, j ∈ Nk,1 or i, j ∈ Nk,0
determines a partition PK of N . It is straightforward to check that the
cost game cof
PK
(N) =
∑
S∈PK
cof
PK
(S). So CS implies that
∑
i∈S Ri
(
PK
)
=
cof
PK
(S) for all S ∈ PK . Moreover, any PL with L ⊂ K is a refinement of
PK , so
∑
i∈S Ri
(
PL
)
= cof
PL
(S) for all S ∈ PK .
We now consider several cases.
Case 1. Assume that PK has at least two components. Given k ∈ K,
there exist S, S′ ∈ PK such that k ∈ S ∩ H and S
′ ⊆ Nk,0. Besides,
cof
PK\{k}
(S′) = cof
PK
(S′). Thus,
cof
PK
(
S′
)
=
∑
i∈S′
Ri
(
PK
) (4)
=
∑
i∈S′
Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+
∣∣S′∣∣xk,0
CS
= cof
PK\{k}
(
S′
)
+
∣∣S′∣∣xk,0 = cof
PK
(
S′
)
+
∣∣S′∣∣xk,0
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which implies that xk,0 = 0. Under (6), xk,1 = dk
nk,1
for all k ∈ K. Under
(5), for each i ∈ N ,
Ri
(
PK
)
= Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+
dk
nk,1
.
Repeating the same reasoning, we deduce that for each i ∈ N ,
Ri
(
PK
)
= Ri
(
P ∅
)
+
∑
k∈Hofi
dk
nk,1
.
Since R satisfies CS, under Theorem 3.1, Ri
(
P ∅
)
=
∑
j∈N λ
h
ij + yi for all
i ∈ N , where 0 ≤ yi ≤
∑
j∈Hofi
d∅j . By definition of d
∅, we have d∅j = 0 for
all j ∈ H. Since Hofi ⊆ H, we deduce yi = 0 and so
Ri
(
P ∅
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij .
By Theorem 3.2,
Ri
(
PK
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
k∈Hofi
dk
nk,1
= Shi
(
PK
)
.
Case 2. Assume now PK = {N}. We consider several subcases.
Case 2.1. Assume K = {k}. Since R satisfies CS, under Theorem 3.1,∑
i∈Nk,0
Ri
(
P {k}
)
=
∑
i∈Nk,0
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Nk,0
yi
where y ∈ RN+ and
0 ≤
∑
i∈Nk,0
yi ≤
∑
j∈Hof
Nk,0
d
{k}
j = 0
which implies
∑
i∈Nk,0 yi = 0. Thus,∑
i∈Nk,0
Ri
(
P {k}
)
=
∑
i∈Nk,0
∑
j∈N
λhij .
On the other hand,∑
i∈Nk,0
Ri
(
P {k}
)
(4)
=
∑
i∈Nk,0
Ri
(
P ∅
)
+ nk,0xk,0 =
∑
i∈Nk,0
∑
j∈N
λhij + n
k,0xk,0
which implies xk,0 = 0. So, for each i ∈ Nk,0,
Ri
(
P {k}
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij = Shi
(
P {k}
)
.
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Under (6), xk,1 = dk
nk,1
. So, for each i ∈ Nk,1,
Ri
(
P {k}
)
= Ri
(
P ∅
)
+
dk
nk,1
=
∑
j∈N
λhij +
dk
nk,1
= Shi
(
P {k}
)
.
Case 2.2. Assume now |K| > 1. We proceed by induction on |K|. Hence,
we assume R
(
PK
′
)
= Sh
(
PK
′
)
when |K ′| < |K|. We have three cases:
Case 2.2.1. Assume first nk,0 = 0 for some k ∈ K. Under (5), for all
i ∈ N = Nk,1,
Ri
(
PK
)
= Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+ xk,1.
Hence, ∑
i∈N
Ri
(
PK
)
=
∑
i∈N
Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+ nxk,1
and thus
xk,1 =
∑
i∈N Ri
(
PK
)
−
∑
i∈N Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
n
=
dk
nk,1
.
Now for all i ∈ N = Nk,1,
Ri
(
PK
)
= Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+
dk
nk,1
.
By induction hypothesis, for all i ∈ N
Ri
(
PK
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Hofi
d
K\{k}
j
nk,1
+
dk
nk,1
=
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Hofi
dKj
nk,1
= Shi
(
PK
)
.
Case 2.2.2. Assume now nk,1 = 0 for some k ∈ K. By (4), Ri
(
PK
)
=
Ri
(
PK\{k}
)
+ xk,0 for all i ∈ N = Nk,0. The rest of reasoning is analogous
to the previous case and we omit it.
Case 2.2.3. Finally, assume nk,0 > 0 and nk,1 > 0 for all k ∈ K. We can
assume w.l.o.g. 1, 2 ∈ K. Let i1 ∈ N1,1 and i2 ∈ N1,0. Since PK = {N},
we know that there exists some k ∈ K such that either i1, i2 ∈ Nk,1 or
i1, i2 ∈ Nk,0. Assume w.l.o.g. that either i1, i2 ∈ N2,1 or i1, i2 ∈ N2,0. For
each k ∈ {1, 2} and each l ∈ {1, 2}, let f l (k) ∈ {0, 1} be defined such that
il ∈ Nk,f
l(k). Hence, we know that f1(1) = 1 (because i1 ∈ N1,1), f2(1) = 0
(because i2 ∈ N1,0), and f1(2) = f2(2) (because either i1, i2 ∈ N2,1 or
i1, i2 ∈ N2,0).
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By induction hypothesis, for any k ∈ {1, 2} and any l ∈ {1, 2},
Ril
(
PK
) (4)(5)
= Ril
(
PK\{k}
)
+ xk,f
l(k) = Shil
(
PK\{k}
)
+ xk,f
l(k)
=
∑
j∈N
λh
ilj
+
∑
j∈Hof
il
d
K\{k}
j
nj,1
+ xk,f
l(k).
Thus, for each l ∈ {1, 2},
x1,f
l(1) − x2,f
l(2) =
∑
j∈Hof
il
d
K\{1}
j − d
K\{2}
j
nj,1
=
d1
n1,1
f l(1)−
d2
n2,1
f l(2).
In particular, taking a = f1(2) = f2(2) and l = 1,
x1,1 − x2,a =
d1
n1,1
−
d2
n2,1
a (7)
and taking l = 2,
x1,0 − x2,a = −
d2
n2,1
a. (8)
Equations (6) for k = 1, 2 and equations (7)-(8) can be written as a
matrix equation as follows:

n1,1 0 n1,0 0
0 n2,1 0 n2,0
1 −a 0 a− 1
0 −a 1 a− 1

 ·


x1,1
x2,1
x1,0
x2,0

 =


d1
d2
d1
n1,1
− d2
n2,1
a
− d2
n2,1
a

 .
The determinant of the left matrix is
(
an− n2,1
)
n 6= 0. Hence, the
matrix equation has a unique solution given by xk,1 = dk
nk,1
and xk,0 = 0 for
all k ∈ {1, 2}. Thus,
Ri1
(
PK
) (5)
= Ri1
(
PK\{1}
)
+ x1,1 = Ri1
(
PK\{1}
)
+
d1
n1,1
Ri2
(
PK
) (4)
= Ri2
(
PK\{1}
)
+ x1,0 = Ri2
(
PK\{1}
)
.
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By induction hypothesis,
Ri1
(
PK
)
= Shi1
(
PK\{1}
)
+
d1
n1,1
Th.3.2
=
∑
j∈N
λhi1j +
∑
k∈Hof
i1
d
K\{1}
k
nk,1
+
d1
n1,1
=
∑
j∈N
λhi1j +
∑
k∈Hof
i1
dKk
nk,1
Th.3.2
= Shi1
(
PK
)
Ri2
(
PK
)
= Shi2
(
PK\{1}
)
Th.3.2
=
∑
j∈N
λhi2j +
∑
k∈Hof
i2
d
K\{1}
k
nk,1
=
∑
j∈N
λhi2j +
∑
k∈Hof
i2
dKk
nk,1
Th.3.2
= Shi2
(
PK
)
.
Since i1, i2 were taken arbitrarily from N1,1 and N1,0, respectively, and
these two sets form a partition of N , we conclude that Ri
(
PK
)
= Shi
(
PK
)
for all i ∈ N .
(b) It follows from part (a) and Proposition 3.1.
Remark 3.2 We now prove that the properties used in Theorem 3.3 are
independent.
• Let R0 be defined as R0(P ) = x + Sh
(
cof
)
for some x ∈ RN with∑
i∈N xi = 0 and xi 6= 0 for some i ∈ N . R
0 satisfies IIH, IIF and
ETH, but fails CS and Pos.
• Let ω ∈ RN be such that ωi > 0 for all i ∈ N and ωi 6= ωj for some
i 6= j. Let R1 be defined for each P and each i ∈ N as follows:
R1i (P ) =
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Hofi
ωi∑
k∈N :j∈Hof
k
ωk
dj .
R1 satisfies CS, Pos, IIH, and IIF , but fails ETH.
• Let R2 be defined for each P and i ∈ N as follows:
R2i (P ) =
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈H
dj
n
.
R2 satisfies Pos, IIF and ETH, but fails CS and IIH.
• Let R3 be defined for each P and i ∈ N as follows:
R3i (P ) =
∑
k∈N
∑
j∈N λ
h
kj
n
+
∑
j∈Hofi
dj∣∣∣{k ∈ N : j ∈ Hofk }∣∣∣ .
R3 satisfies Pos, IIH and ETH,but fails CS and IIF .
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4 Two-way flow
In this section, we assume that nodes are interested in both outgoing and
ingoing flow. Namely, the cost of a group of nodes depends on the outgoing
and the ingoing flow of such nodes. We first associate to each hub network
problem a cost game. Then, we study the core and the Shapley value of
such game.
For each hub network problem P , we associate the cost game ctfP where
for each S ⊆ N , ctfP (S) is the cost of sending and receiving the flow of all
nodes in S to and from all nodes through h. The cost game ctfP models
situations where an (optimal) hub network h (with associated set of hubs
H) has already been constructed. Thus, d can be considered as a vector of
maintenance costs. We formally define this cost game as follows:
ctfP (S) =
∑
(i,j)/∈(N\S)×(N\S)
λhij +
∑
i∈Htf
S
di (9)
for all S ⊆ N . When no confusion arises we write ctf instead of ctfP .
4.1 The core
In next theorem we prove that in the core allocations of ctf the cost of send-
ing or receiving flow between two nodes is divided between them. Besides,
the cost of any hub is divided among the nodes that use the hub for sending
or receiving their flow. Before stating the theorem we need some notation.
Let Π = {pi : N −→ N : pi biyective} be the set of orderings of agents in
N . Given i ∈ N and j ∈ H, Πij ⊂ Π is the set of orderings such that node
i is the first that uses hub j, i.e. pi(l) = i implies j /∈ Htfpi(l′) for all l
′ < l.
Theorem 4.1 For each hub network problem, ctf is concave. Moreover, the
core is nonempty and given by the convex hull of the following set of vectors:


 ∑
j∈N :pi−1(j)>pi−1(i)
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
+
∑
j∈Htfi :pi∈Πij
dj


i∈N


pi∈Π
.
Proof. We first prove that
(
N, ctf
)
is concave. Let l ∈ T ⊂ S ⊆ N . Since
for each S′ ⊂ N , HtfS′ =
⋃
i∈S′ H
tf
i , we have that
HtfS \H
tf
S\{l} ⊂ H
tf
T \H
tf
T\{l}. (10)
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Then,
ctf (S′)− ctf
(
S′ \ {l}
)
=
∑
(i,j)/∈(N\S′)×(N\S′)
λhij +
∑
i∈HS′
di
−
∑
(i,j)/∈(N\(S′\{l}))×(N\(S′\{l}))
λhij −
∑
i∈Htf
S′\{l}
di
=
∑
i∈N\S′
λhil +
∑
j∈N\S′
λhlj +
∑
i∈Htf
S′
\Htf
S\{l}
di.
Since all terms are non-negative, N \ S ⊂ N \ T and (10), we have that
ctf (S)− ctf (S \ {l}) ≤ ctf (T )− ctf (T \ {l})
which proves that
(
N, ctf
)
is concave.
It is well-known that, when the cost game is concave, the core coin-
cides with the Weber set. Thus, the core is the convex hull of the vectors
of marginal contributions. Notice that the coordinate i of the vector of
marginal contributions for pi ∈ Π is∑
j∈N :pi−1(j)>pi−1(i)
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
+
∑
j∈Htfi :pi∈Πij
dj ,
from where the result trivially holds.
Analogously to the one-way flow case, we consider an intermediate sit-
uation between a fixed hub network and a variable hub network. Assume
that the optimal hub network is not unique. We can define the cost of a
coalition as the minimum over all optimal hub networks. Namely, for each
S ⊆ N ,
c∗∗ (S) = min
h∈H,h is optimal
{
ctfP (h)(S)
}
where P (h) is the hub network problem induced by the optimal hub network
h. Next example shows that the core of c∗∗ can be empty.
Example 4.1 Let P be such that N = {1, 2, . . . , 6}, α = 1, f12 = f34 =
f56 = 1, fij = 0 otherwise, d1 = d2 = d3 = 1 and di ≥ 4 otherwise. The cost
matrix is given in the following table:
cij 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 2 3 3 3
2 1 3 4 3
3 4 3 3
4 3 3
5 4
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This hub problem is depicted in Figure 1.
1
2
3
4
5
6
2 1
2
4
4
4
Figure 1: cij = 3 when no specified. Flow goes from 1 to 2, from 3 to 4, and
from 5 to 6.
There exist three optimal hub networks h1, h2, and h3, corresponding to
putting a single hub at either 1, 2 or 3, respectively. The cost of these net-
works is 14 each. Hence, c∗∗(N) = 14. Moreover, nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 can cover
their own flow at cost 7 when the hub is located at 2. Then, c∗∗({1, 2, 3, 4}) =
7. Analogously, nodes 1, 2, 5, 6 can cover their own flow at cost 9 when
the hub is located at 1, so that c∗∗({1, 2, 5, 6}) = 9. Analogously, nodes
3, 4, 5, 6 can cover their own flow at cost 11 when the hub is located at
3, so that c∗∗({3, 4, 5, 6}) = 11. Hence, a core allocation y should satisfy
y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 ≤ 7, y1 + y2 + y5 + y6 ≤ 9, and y3 + y4 + y5 + y6 ≤ 11. By
adding these inequalities and dividing by 2, we deduce that
∑
i∈N yi ≤ 13.5.
Since c∗∗(N) = 14, we deduce that the core of c∗∗ is empty.
4.2 The Shapley value
We now study the Shapley value of ctf , which we also call the Shapley rule.
In next theorem, we prove that in the Shapley rule the cost of sending flow
between a pair of nodes (λhij) is divided equally between both nodes. Besides,
the cost of any hub is divided equally among the nodes that use the hub for
sending or receiving their flow.
Theorem 4.2 For each hub network problem P and each i ∈ N ,
Shi
(
ctf
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij + λ
h
ji
2
+
∑
j∈Htfi
dj∣∣∣{k ∈ N : j ∈ Htfk }∣∣∣ . (11)
Proof. It is well known that the Shapley value is the average of the vectors
of marginal contributions. Thus,
Shi
(
ctf
)
=
1
|Π|

∑
pi∈Π
∑
j∈N :pi−1(j)>pi−1(i)
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
+
∑
j∈Htfi
∑
pi∈Πij
dj

 .
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Let Πij =
{
pi ∈ Π : pi−1(j) > pi−1(i)
}
. Clearly, |Πij | = |Π|2 . Hence,
1
|Π|
∑
pi∈Π
∑
j∈N :pi−1(j)>pi−1(i)
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
=
1
|Π|
∑
j∈N
∑
pi∈Πij
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
=
1
|Π|
∑
j∈N
|Πij |
(
λhij + λ
h
ji
)
=
∑
j∈N
λhij + λ
h
ji
2
which is the first part of (11).
Let T =
{
k ∈ N : j ∈ Htfk
}
and t = |T |. We still need to prove that
1
|Π|
∑
j∈Htfi
∑
pi∈Πij
dj =
∑
j∈Htfi
dj
t . Clearly, it is enough to prove that
|Πij |
|Π| =
1
t for all j ∈ H
tf
i . Notice that Πij is the set of orderings in which the
predecessors of i are not in T . In particular, Πij =
⋃
s=1,...,n−t+1Π
s
ij where
Πsij = {pi ∈ Πij : pi(s) = i}. Hence,
|Πij |
|Π| =
∑n−t+1
s=1
|Πsij|
|Π| . Moreover,
|Πsij|
|Π| is
the probability of randomly picking up an order in Π satisfying that node i
is in position s and it is preceded by s−1 nodes in N \T . Let |N \ T | = n−t.
Then,∣∣∣Πsij∣∣∣
|Π|
=
n− t
n
·
n− t− 1
n− 1
· · · · ·
n− t− s+ 2
n− s+ 2
·
1
n− s+ 1
=
(n− s)!(n− t)!
n!(n− t− s+ 1)!
So
|Πij |
|Π|
=
(n− t)!
n!
n−t+1∑
s=1
(n− s)!
(n− s− t+ 1)!
=
(n− t)!t!
n!
n−t+1∑
s=1
(n− s)!
(n− s− t+ 1)!(t− 1)!
·
1
t
=
1(
n
t
) n−t+1∑
s=1
(
n− s
t− 1
)
1
t
.
Then, it is enough to prove that
(
n
t
)
=
∑n−t+1
s=1
(
n−s
t−1
)
. This is trivially true
when n = 1. By induction hypothesis on n, and using Stidel formula:(
n
t
)
=
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
+
(
n− 1
t
)
=
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
+
n−t∑
s=1
(
n− 1− s
t− 1
)
=
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
+
n−t+1∑
s=2
(
n− s
t− 1
)
=
n−t+1∑
s=1
(
n− s
t− 1
)
.
We now define the property of core selection in the two-way flow case.
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Core Selection (CS) For any hub network problem P , we have that
R (P ) ∈ Core
(
ctfP
)
.
The analogous results for Proposition 3.1 also hold in the two-way flow
case.
Proposition 4.1 (a) CS implies Pos.
(b) Pos, IIH and IIF imply CS.
Proof. It is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1 and we omit it.
CS does not imply neither IIH nor IIF . The rule in which each node
pays half the cost of sending and receiving her flow and the cost of each hub
is paid equally by the nodes that use the most expensive hubs among those
that use that hub satisfies CS but not IIH. The rule in which each node
pays half the cost of sending and receiving her flow and the cost of each hub
is paid equally by the nodes sending more flow through this hub satisfies
CS but not IIF .
In next proposition we prove that the Shapley rule satisfies all the prop-
erties we have defined in Subsection 2.1 for the two-way flow case.
Proposition 4.2 The Shapley rule satisfies Pos, ETE, CS, NF , FM ,
HM , CM , ETH, IIH, IIF and ETF .
Proof. The proof for Pos, ETE, CS, NF , FM , HM , CM , ETH, IIH
and IIF is analogous to that of Proposition 3.2 (using Theorem 4.2 instead
of Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 4.1 instead of Proposition 3.1) and we omit
it.
Let P, P ′ be given as in the definition of ETF . We consider two cases:
1. {i, j} = {k, l}. Let λh
′
the λh associated with P ′. By Theorem 4.2,
Shi
(
ctfP
)
− Shi
(
ctfP ′
)
=
λhij − λ
h′
ij
2
= Shj
(
ctfP
)
− Shj
(
ctfP ′
)
,
and hence Sh
(
ctf
)
satisfies ETF .
2. {i, j} ∩ {k, l} = ∅. Under Theorem 4.2,
Shi
(
ctfP
)
− Shi
(
ctfP ′
)
= 0 = Shj
(
ctfP
)
− Shj
(
ctfP ′
)
.
Similarly to Theorem 3.3, we give two characterizations of the Shapley
rule.
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Theorem 4.3 (a) The Shapley rule is the unique rule satisfying CS, ETH
and ETF .
(b) The Shapley rule is the unique rule satisfying Pos, IIH, IIF , ETH,
and ETF .
Proof. (a) By Proposition 4.2 the Shapley rule satisfies these properties.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let R be a rule satisfying CS, ETH and
ETF .
Let P = (N,C, F, d, α, h) be a hub network problem. We assume di = 0
for all i ∈ H; the extension to positive hub costs is analogous to the proof
of Theorem 3.3 and we omit it.
Let E = {(i, j) : fij > 0} and, for each i ∈ N and e ∈ E, let a
i(e) =
1 when node i is adjacent to e, and ai(e) = 0 otherwise. Denote E =
{e1, . . . , eγ}. We assume, w.l.o.g., e1 = (1, 2). We also assume, w.l.o.g.,
e2 = (2, 1) in case (2, 1) ∈ E.
For each ε > 0, let P ε = (N,C, F ε, d, α, h) defined by f εij = ε for all (i, j)
with fij > 0, and f
ε
ij = fij = 0 otherwise.
Let a(P ) de defined as in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose that, for
ε small enough, there exists xP ∈ RN with −7|E|a(P )ε ≤ xPi ≤ 7
|E|a(P )ε
for all i ∈ N such that
Ri(P ) =
∑
e∈E
λhe
2
ai(e) + xPi for all i ∈ N. (12)
Since Ri(P ) does not depend on ε, we deduce that for all i ∈ N
Ri(P ) =
∑
e∈E
λhe
2
ai(e) =
∑
j∈N
λhij + λ
h
ji
2
= Shi(P ).
Hence, we just need to prove that (12) holds.
For each ek ∈ E, we define P
−k =
(
N,C, F−k, d, α, h
)
with f−kek = ε
and f−kij = fij otherwise. For notational convenience, we write λ
h
k , f
−k
ij and
ai(k) instead of λhek , f
−ek
ij and a
i(ek), respectively.
We proceed by induction on |E|. Case E = ∅ is not possible because H
is nonempty and for each k ∈ H we assume that there exist i, j ∈ N with
fij > 0 and k ∈ {h (i) , h (j)}.
Assume then E = {e1}. In this case, P
−1 = P ε. Let xPi = 0 if i /∈ {1, 2}
and xPi = Ri(P ) −
λh
1
2 if i ∈ {1, 2}. We prove that for all i ∈ N , x
P
i lies on
the interval [−7a(P )ε, 7a(P )ε].
Let i /∈ {1, 2}. By CS, Ri(P ) ≤ c
tf
P ({i}) = 0. Since a
i(e1) = 0 and
λhe = 0 when e 6= e1, (12) holds trivially.
We now prove it for i = 1 (the case i = 2 is analogous). By ETF , there
exists y1,1 ∈ R such that R1(P ) − R1
(
P−1
)
= R2(P ) − R2
(
P−1
)
= y1,1.
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Hence,
y1,1 =
R1(P ) +R2(P )−R1(P
−1)−R2(P
−1)
2
.
By CS, 0 ≤ R1(P ) + R2(P ) = λ
h
1 and 0 ≤ R1(P
−1) + R2(P
−1) ≤ a(P )ε.
Hence,
y1,1 ∈
[
λh1
2
− a(P )ε,
λh1
2
+ a(P )ε
]
.
By induction hypothesis, xP
−1
1 ∈ [−a(P )ε, a(P )ε]. Thus,
R1(P ) = R1
(
P−1
)
+ y1,1 = xP
−1
1 + y
1,1 ∈
[
λh1
2
− 2a(P )ε,
λh1
2
+ 2a(P )ε
]
.
and so (12) holds with xP1 = R1(P )−
λh
1
2 .
Assume now (12) holds when |E| < γ and suppose |E| = γ. We consider
several cases:
Case 1. γ = 2 and e2 = (2, 1), so that E = {e1, e2}. Then, we proceed
as above defining y1,1 in the same way.
Case 2. Either γ > 2 or e2 6= (2, 1). Notice that this implies n > 2. Fix
i ∈ N . We consider two cases.
Case 2.1. ai(e) = 0 for all e ∈ E. We take xPi = 0. Then, by CS, (12)
holds because Ri(P ) = 0.
Case 2.2. There exists k ∈ E such that ai(k) = 1. Fix also el ∈ E \ {ek}
with different adjacent nodes than ek. We can find such el because either
γ > 2 or e2 6= (2, 1).
ETF implies that there exist yk,0, yk,1, yl,0 and yl,1 such that Rj (P ) −
Rj
(
P−k
)
= yk,a
j(k) and Rj (P )−Rj
(
P−l
)
= yl,a
j(l) for all j ∈ N .Since
∑
j∈N
Rj (P )−
∑
j∈N
Rj
(
P−k
)
= λhk −
λhk
fk
ε,
we have
2yk,1 + (n− 2)yk,0 = λhk + z
k,1 (13)
where zk,1 = −
λh
k
fk
ε ∈ [−a(P )ε, 0]. Analogously,
2yl,1 + (n− 2)yl,0 = λhl + z
l,1 (14)
with zl,1 ∈ [−a(P )ε, 0].
On the other hand, Ri(P ) = Ri(P
−k) + yk,1 = Ri(P
−l) + yl,a
i(l). Hence,
yk,1 − yl,a
i(l) = Ri(P
−l)−Ri(P
−k)
by induction hypothesis,
=
λhk
2
−
λhl
2
ai(l) + xP
−l
i − x
P−k
i
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with xP
−l
i , x
P−k
i ∈ [−7
γ−1a(P )ε, 7γ−1a(P )ε].
We define zk,0 = xP
−l
i − x
P−k
i ∈ [−2 · 7
γ−1a(P )ε, 2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε] so that
yk,1 − yl,a
i(l) =
λhk
2
−
λhl
2
ai(l) + zk,0. (15)
We repeat the reasoning for some j ∈ N adjacent to el (i.e. a
j(l) = 1)
but not to ek (i.e. a
j(k) = 0). We can find such j because el has different
adjacent nodes than ek. Then, we get
yl,1 − yk,0 =
λhl
2
+ zl,0 (16)
with zl,0 ∈ [−2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε].
Equations (13)-(14)-(15)-(16) form a system of linear equations given by


2 0 n− 2 0
0 2 0 n− 2
1 −ai(l) 0 ai(l)− 1
0 1 −1 0

 ·


yk,1
yl,1
yk,0
yl,0

 =


λhk + z
k,1
λhl + z
l,1
λh
k
2 −
λh
l
2 a
i(l) + zk,0
λh
k
2 + z
l,0

 .
The determinant of the first matrix is (n + 2ai(l) − 4)n. We consider
several cases.
Case 2.2.1. ai(l) = 1. Then, (n + 2ai(l) − 4)n 6= 0. Thus, the previous
system of linear equations have a unique solution which is given for yk,1 by
yk,1 =
λhk
2
+
z
(n− 2)n
where z = (n− 2)zk,1 − nzl,1 + (n2 − 4n+ 4)zk,0 + (n2 − 4n+ 4)zl,0.
Since zk,1, zl,1, zk,0, zl,0 ∈ [−2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε], we deduce that
z ∈ [−2(2n2 − 6n+ 6) · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 2(2n2 − 6n+ 6) · 7γ−1a(P )ε].
For n > 2, we have 2(2n
2−6n+6)
(n−2)n ≤ 6 and hence
z
(n− 2)n
∈ [−6 · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 6 · 7γ−1a(P )ε]. (17)
By induction hypothesis,
Ri(P ) = Ri(P
−k) + yk,1 =
∑
e∈E
λhe
2
ai(e) + xP
−l
i +
z
(n− 2)n
.
Let us define xPi = x
P−l
i +
z
(n−2)n . By (17) and x
P−l
i ∈ [7
γ−1a(P )ε, 7γ−1a(P )ε],
we deduce that xPi ∈ [−7
γa(P )ε, 7γa(P )ε].
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Case 2.2.2. ai(l) = 0 and n 6= 4. Then, (n+2ai(l)− 4)n 6= 0. Thus, the
previous system of linear equations have a unique solution which is given
for yl,0 by
yl,0 =
z
(n− 4)n
where z = −2zk,1 + (n− 2)zl,1 + 4zk,0 + (−2n+ 4)zl,0.
Since zk,1, zl,1, zk,0, zl,0 ∈ [−2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 2 · 7γ−1a(P )ε], we deduce that
z ∈
[
−3n · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 3n · 7γ−1a(P )ε
]
.
For n ≥ 3, n 6= 4 we have 6n(n−4)n ≤ 6 and hence
yl,0 ∈ [−6 · 7γ−1a(P )ε, 6 · 7γ−1a(P )ε]. (18)
By induction hypothesis,
Ri(P ) = Ri(P
−l) + yl,0 =
∑
e∈E
λhe
2
ai(e) + xP
−l
i + y
l,0.
Let us define xPi = x
P−l
i +y
l,0. By (18) and xP
−l
i ∈ [−7
γ−1a(P )ε, 7γ−1a(P )ε],
we deduce that xPi ∈ [−7
γa(P )ε, 7γa(P )ε].
Case 2.2.3. ai(l) = 0 and n = 4. Then, (n + 2ai(l) − 4)n = 0. In this
case we replace equation (16) by either yk,0−yl,0 = zlk,0 or yl,1−yk,1 =
λh
l
2 −
λh
k
2 + z
lk,1, with zlk,· ∈ [−2 · 7γ−1ε, 2 · 7γ−1ε]. Now the resulting determinant
is non zero. The rest of the proof is similar and we omit further details.
(b) It follows from (a), Proposition 4.2, and Proposition 4.1.
Remark 4.1 We now prove that the properties used in Theorem 4.3 are
independent.
• Let R0 be defined as R0(P ) = x + Sh
(
ctf
)
for some x ∈ RN with∑
i∈N xi = 0 and xi 6= 0 for some i ∈ N . R
0 satisfies IIH, IIF ,
ETH and ETF , but fails CS and Pos.
• Let ω ∈ RN be such that ωi > 0 for all i ∈ N and ωi 6= ωj for some
i 6= j. Let R1 be defined for each P and each i ∈ N as follows:
R1i (P ) =
∑
j∈N
λhij + λ
h
ji
2
+
∑
j∈Htfi
ωi∑
k∈N :j∈Htf
k
ωk
dj .
R1 satisfies CS, Pos, IIH, IIF and ETF , but fails ETH.
• Let R2 be defined for each P and i ∈ N as follows:
R2i (P ) =
∑
j∈N
λhij + λ
h
ji
2
+
∑
j∈H
dj
n
.
R2 satisfies Pos, IIF , ETH and ETF , but fails CS and IIH.
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• Let R3 be defined for each P and i ∈ N as follows:
R3i (P ) =
∑
k∈N
∑
j∈N
λhkj
n
+
∑
j∈Htfi
dj∣∣∣{k ∈ N : j ∈ Htfk }∣∣∣ .
R3 satisfies Pos, ETH, IIH and ETF , but fails CS and IIF .
• Let R4 be defined for each P and i ∈ N as follows:
R4i (P ) =
∑
j∈N
λhij +
∑
j∈Htfi
dj∣∣∣{k ∈ N : j ∈ Htfk }∣∣∣ .
R4 satisfies CS, Pos, IIH, IIF and ETH but fails ETF .
5 Some examples
We now present some examples where we compute the Shapley rule and
compare it with the rule considered in Matsubayashi et al., 2005.
We first provide an example of a hub problem in which the proportional
rule proposed by (Matsubayashi et al., 2005, Theorem 3.1) does not belong
to the core, whereas the one-way Shapley value does.
Example 5.1 Let P be such that N = {1, 2, 3}, α = 0.1, di = 3 for all
i ∈ N , c12 = 1, c13 = c23 = 10, f13 = f23 = 1 and fij = 10 otherwise. There
is no congestion cost. In this problem, there exists a unique optimal hub
network. It has three hubs, one at each node, and the total cost is 33. The
proportional rule gives the cost allocation u∗ = (8.643, 8.643, 15.714), which
does not belong to the core because cof ({1, 2}) = 13 < 2 · 8.643 = u∗1 + u
∗
2.
As opposed, the Shapley rule gives the cost allocation (5, 5, 23), which does
belong to the core.
We now apply our results to Example 4.3 in Matsubayashi et al. (2005).
Example 5.2 (Example 4.3 in Matsubayashi et al. (2005)) Let P be
such that N = {1, 2, . . . , 7}, α = 0.2, di = 65 for all i ∈ N . The flow and
cost matrices are both symmetric and given in the following respective ta-
bles3:
fij 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.5 1 1
2 0.1 1.5 1.5 1 1
3 1.5 1.5 1 1
4 0.1 1 1
5 1 1
6 f67
3These tables correct some irrelevant typos presented in Matsubayashi et al. (2005).
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cij 2 3 4 5 6 7 7
1 1.5 1.5 59 58 96 93 87
2 1.5 60 59 96 93 86
3 60 59 97 94 87
4 2 106 110 116
5 107 111 117
6 4 10
The cost matrix assigns two columns to node 7. The first one applies when
node 7 represents Osaka. The second one applies when node 7 represents
Seoul. The other nodes represent London (node 1), Brussels (node 2), Paris
(node 3), Washington (node 4), Ottawa (node 5), and Tokyo (node 6). There
is also a congestion factor that increases the cost at each node by 0.1% of
the flow that goes through it.
When f67 = 0.1 or f67 = 1, and node 7 represents Osaka, the optimal
hub network is depicted in Figure 2, with hubs at nodes 1, 5 and 7.
12
3 4
5
67
Figure 2: Optimal hub network which arises in Example 4.3(a) and Example
4.3(b) in Matsubayashi et al. (2005).
When f67 = 25 and node 7 represents Osaka, or f67 = 10 and node 7
represents Seoul, the optimal hub network is depicted in Figure 3, with hubs
at nodes 1, 5, 6 and 7.
12
3 4
5
67
Figure 3: Optimal hub network which arises in Example 4.3(c) and Example
4.3(d) in Matsubayashi et al. (2005).
We now compare the rule suggested by (Matsubayashi et al., 2005, Theo-
rem 3.2), also denoted as u∗, and the one-way Shapley rule.4 The allocation
4Due to the symmetry of the matrices, the fact that all flows are positive, and the low
congestion rate, both the one-way case and two-way case give very similar values for the
Shapley rule.
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for Osaka is represented in next table (in parenthesis, the value of f67 for
each column):
Osaka (f67 = 0.1) Osaka (f67 = 1) Osaka (f67 = 25)
i u∗i Shi u
∗
i Shi u
∗
i Shi
1 109.6 107.5 109.4 107.5 102.0 113.4
2 109.6 115.2 109.4 115.2 102.0 121.1
3 109.6 115.2 109.4 115.2 102.0 121.1
4 144.7 146.6 144.5 146.6 135.6 151.2
5 144.7 133.6 144.5 133.6 135.6 138.1
6 143.6 153.8 147.8 157.4 199.9 166.0
7 143.6 133.7 147.8 137.4 199.7 165.8
For each i ∈ N , let fi· =
∑
j fij denote the flow that leaves node i. Next
table shows the cost allocation per unit of flow (yi/fi·):
Osaka (f67 = 0.1) Osaka (f67 = 1) Osaka (f67 = 25)
i u∗i /fi· Shi/fi· u
∗
i /fi· Shi/fi· u
∗
i /fi· Shi/fi·
1 21.08 20.67 21.05 20.67 19.61 21.81
2 21.08 22.15 21.05 22.15 19.61 23.29
3 21.08 22.15 21.05 22.15 19.61 23.29
4 21.92 22.22 21.89 22.22 20.55 22.91
5 21.92 20.24 21.89 20.24 20.55 20.92
6 28.16 30.15 24.63 26.24 6.662 5.534
7 28.16 26.22 24.63 22.90 6.656 5.527
The main differences between the one-way Shapley rule and u∗ are the
following:
1. Under the Shapley rule, it is preferable to be a hub because hub nodes
pay less than the other nodes connected to it. Under u∗, nodes con-
nected to the same hub pay the same. For instance, when f67 = 1,
node 1 is a hub and nodes 2 and 3 are connected to node 1. Under the
Shapley rule, node 1 pays less than nodes 2 and 3. Under u∗, node 1
pays the same as nodes 2 and 3.
2. When f67 increases from 0.1 to 1 and the other flows do not change,
the optimal hub network does not change. Under the Shapley rule, the
cost increase is charged to the nodes responsible for it (nodes 6 and
7), leaving the rest unaffected. Under, u∗, nodes 6 and 7 pay more
whereas the rest of nodes pay less.
3. When f67 increases from 1 to 25 and the other flows do not change, the
optimal hub network also changes. Under the Shapley rule, all nodes
pay more (specially nodes 6 and 7). Under u∗, nodes 6 and 7 pay more
whereas the rest of nodes pay less.
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Similar comments apply to the case of Seoul. Both allocations for Seoul
are represented in next table (in parenthesis, the value of f67):
Seoul (f67 = 10)
i u∗i Shi u
∗
i /fi· Shi/fi·
1 102.9 112.2 19.79 21.57
2 102.9 119.9 19.79 23.05
3 102.9 119.9 19.79 23.05
4 139.0 152.3 21.05 23.08
5 139.0 139.2 21.05 23.08
6 191.9 163.5 12.79 10.90
7 190.5 162.1 12.70 10.80
6 Concluding remarks
We have considered two cost sharing problem associated with hub network
problems. We have defined two respective cooperative cost games and we
have proved that their cores are non-empty. Besides, we have computed the
Shapley value of such cost games. We have proved that the Shapley value
belongs to the core and we have provided some axiomatic characterizations.
We now compare our results with the three papers that study other cost
sharing problems associated with hub networks. We consider several issues:
• About the class of hub network problems.
Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) considers that the number of hubs to be
located is fixed. Matsubayashi et al. (2005) and this paper consider
that it is a variable.
Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) assumes that locating a hub at some node
has no cost. Matsubayashi et al. (2005) and this paper consider that
there may be a cost.
In Skorin-Kapov (2001), direct connection between non-hubs nodes
are possible. In Skorin-Kapov (1998), Matsubayashi et al. (2005), and
this paper, a non-hub node is only directly connected to a hub node.
In Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and this paper, there is no congestion
cost. In Matsubayashi et al. (2005), there is a congestion cost.
• About the cooperative game. When the cost of a coalition S of nodes
is computed:
In Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and Matsubayashi et al. (2005), the cost
only depends on the outgoing flow of nodes in S. In this paper, we
consider two cases. In the one-way flow case, the cost only depends
on the outgoing flow of nodes in S. In the two-way flow case, the cost
depends on the outgoing and the ingoing flow of nodes in S.
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In some games in Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and this paper, nodes
in S can use only the hubs of the constructed network h. In some
games in Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001); Matsubayashi et al. (2005) and
this paper, nodes in S can construct the hub they use for sending the
flow optimally.
In the games in Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and this paper, nodes in
S can decide only on the traffic generated by the nodes in S. In
Matsubayashi et al. (2005), nodes in S can decide on the traffic of all
nodes.
• About the core of the cooperative game.
In some games in Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and this paper, the core
is always nonempty. In Matsubayashi et al. (2005) and some games in
Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) and this paper, the core can be empty.
• About the rule considered.
Skorin-Kapov (1998, 2001) does not study any specific rule. In this
paper, we study two rules based on the Shapley value. In Matsubayashi
et al. (2005), they study the rule that divides the cost proportionally
to the traffic generated by each node.
The rules considered in this paper are characterized axiomatically. The
rule in Matsubayashi et al. (2005) is not.
The main differences between this paper and the other papers are two.
First, we consider the two-way case, which has not been studied before.
Second, we give an explicit formula for the Shapley rule and we provide
axiomatic characterizations of it. Notice that no characterization of other
rules has been provided in the other papers.
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